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Best Practices for Operating Government-Industry Partnerships
in Cyber Security
Abstract
Since the publication of the first National Strategy to Secure Cyber Space in 2003 the US
federal government has realized that due to the interconnected nature of the Internet,
securing the system would require an industry-government partnership. However, defining
exactly what that new partnership would look like and how it would operate has been
unclear. The ramifications of this ambiguous strategy have been noted elsewhere including
the 2011 JSS article “A Relationship on the Brink” which described the dysfunctional state
of public private partnerships with respect to cyber security. Subsequently, a joint industrygovernment study of partnership programs has generated a consensus list of “best
practices” for operating such programs successfully. Moreover, subsequent use of these
principles seems to confirm their ability to enhance the partnership and hopefully helps
ameliorate, to some degree, the growing cyber threat. This article provides a brief history
of the evolution of public-private partnerships in cyber security, the joint study to assess
them and the 12 best practices generated by that analysis.
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Introduction
Shortly after taking office in 2009, President Barak Obama called for a
comprehensive review of the nation’s approach to combating cyber threats.
The President said:
“The Federal Government cannot succeed in securing cyber space if it
works in isolation. The public and private sectors interests are
intertwined with a shared responsibility for ensuring a secure, reliable
infrastructure upon which businesses and government depend…Only
through such partnerships will the United States be able to enhance
cyber security and reap the full benefits of the digital revolution.”1
This article is an attempt to review the nation’s approach to combating cyber
threats, and how “best practices” for public-private partnerships may help
ameliorate—to some degree—growing cyber threats. The first section
describes a brief history of the evolution of cyber-focused public-private
partnerships, followed by a discussion of case studies in how such
partnerships have demonstrated effective results in enhancing cyber security
through a robust assessment process. The article concludes with 12 best
practices generated by that analysis for more effective management of cyber
partnership activities. Ideally, partnerships would continue to evolve to share
leadership, appreciate differing perspectives, and develop shared goals and
priorities. The digital economy increasingly requires this kind of collaborative
environment to continue to flourish, encouraged by the meaningful cyber
security accomplishments of public-private partnerships.

A Brief History of the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) for
Cyber Security
When the first National Strategy to Secure Cyber Space2 was written in 2003
the mutually shared nature of the Internet led to the proposition that cyber
space would best be secured through a partnership of mutual benefit. It was
assumed that industry’s natural interest would lead it to develop adequate
technologies and practices to secure the expanding cyber systems.
Executive Office of the President, “Cyberspace Policy Review; Assuring a Trusted and
Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure,” White House.gov, 2009,
available at:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf.
2 President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, The National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace (Washington, D.C.: President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board,
2002).
1
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Government’s role was initially thought to be primarily securing its own
systems. With respect to the private sector, government’s role was largely
confined to education, international coordination and assisting with R&D.
Market efficiency was assumed to be sufficient to drive adoption of adequate
protective measures.
By the time the first National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)3 was
written in 2006 and updated in 20134 a more sophisticated understanding of
digital economics made it apparent that the public and private sectors had
“aligned, but not identical, interests” with respect to cyber security.
Experience demonstrated that commercial security levels were generally
lower than those required for national security and other governmental
purposes. The NIPP clarified that a voluntary partnership model that could
respond to the quickly changing cyber environment was in the nation’s
national and homeland security interests. However, for this voluntary model
to succeed, government would need to do more than just rely on naked
market forces or traditional regulation to prompt the private sector to elevate
its security spending to meet national security needs.
The NIPP articulated the notion that, to create a sustainably secure cyber
system, government could not rely on the private sector to continually make
substantial investments that were commercially uneconomic. Instead, an
incentive system similar to those used to achieve social needs in sectors such
as agriculture, environment, transportation and others would have to be
evolved and applied to the cyber security partnership.
“The success of the partnership depends on articulating the mutual
benefits to government and private sector partners. While articulating
the value proposition to the government typically is clear, it is often
more difficult to articulate the direct benefits of participation for the
private sector...In assessing the value proposition for the private
sector….government can encourage industry to go beyond efforts
already justified by their corporate business needs to assist in broad
scale CI/KR (critical infrastructure/key resource) protection through
activities such as…supporting incentives for companies to voluntarily
adopt widely accepted security practices.”5

Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan: 2006
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2006).
4 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan: 2013
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2013)
5 Ibid., p. 15.
3
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There were periodic efforts to redefine the partnership model to secure cyber
space in such a way as to mimic the traditional government-industry
regulatory model. The most prominent of these efforts was legislation, which
combined efforts of the Senate Homeland Security Committee and Commerce
Committee in 2012. This combined bill, drafted under the auspices of Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid and generally referred to as “Lieberman-Collins
bill,” would have empowered the Department of Homeland Security to set
cyber security mandates for large portions of the private sector and grant
DHS compliance authority backed by substantial penalties for noncompliance. It defined this new partnership in the following way:
“This bill creates a dynamic partnership between government and the
private sector in which the private sector is responsible for enhancing
security of the nation’s most critical infrastructure while the
government ensures effective oversight and compliance.”6
Perhaps not surprisingly, industry found this construction of the partnership
somewhat strained.
The idea that the private sector would fund national defense needs, including
defending against potential nation-state attacks against critical infrastructure,
was both naive and impractical. As Busch and Austen Givens pointed out in
one of the few academic analyses of public private partnerships, “Any
business executive who suddenly announced he was increasing security
spending by 25 percent for the good of the nation would almost certainly be
fired.”7
This is not to say that industry is unwilling to spend on cyber security. In fact,
industry spending on cyber security has more than doubled in recent years
and is now over $100 billion a year.8 By comparison, DHS spending on cyber
security is just over $1 billion annually and total federal government spending
is under $15 billion.9

Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 3414, 112th Cong. (2012).
Nathan E. Busch, and Austen D. Givens, “Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland
Security: Opportunities and Challenges,” Homeland Security Affairs 8: 18 (October 2012),
available at: https://www.hsaj.org/articles/233.
8 Ponemon Institute, "Cyber Security Incident Response: Are We as Prepared as We
Think?" Lancope, (January 2014), available at
http://www.lancope.com/files/documents/Industry-Reports/Lancope-PonemonReport-Cyber-Security-Incident-Response.pdf/
9 National Infrastructure Protection Plan: 2006.
6
7

55
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 8, No. 4

In addition to the financial issues that undermine the attempt to define a
traditional regulatory approach as a partnership, there were numerous other
reasons why the regulatory approach to cyber security was ill founded, which
have been detailed elsewhere.10 These include the generally unfounded
assumption that the primary reason for successful cyber-attacks is corporate
malfeasance by under-funding security as opposed to the inherent weakness
in the technology and the sophistication of the attackers. There has also been
notable lack of success for the regulatory approaches that have been tried in
this area, such as HIPPA (health care) and Gramm-Leech-Bliley (financial
services), and the enormous negative economic impact that imposing a
government-centric regulatory regime would have on goals as desirable as
security such as innovation, economic growth, and job creation.11 As a result
of all these problems and despite holding a strong majority in the Senate, the
Lieberman-Collins bill couldn’t get enough support to even get to the floor.
Following the collapse of the regulatory effort to impose cyber security
mandates on critical infrastructure, President Obama issued Executive Order
13636 in February of 2013, which was accompanied by PDD-25. Both
documents embraced the voluntary model of industry-government
partnership for cyber security and more fully defined several of the elements
that would be necessary for it to succeed. The President’s Executive Order
largely followed the “Cyber Security Social Contract” paradigm that had been
proposed by a coalition of industry and privacy groups.12
This renewed and more fully articulated partnership model called for industry
to work collectively with government through the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) to identify industry based standards and
practices worthy of voluntary adoption by critical infrastructure owners and
operators. This framework was to be voluntary, scalable, cost effective, and
prioritized. The Administration pledged not to seek additional regulatory
powers for cyber security and to promote voluntary adoption of the targeted
standards and practices through the deployment of market incentives.13
In a rare case of bipartisanship, the Social Contract model contract was also
embraced by the House GOP Task Force on cyber security that had been

Larry Clinton, "A Relationship on the Rocks: Industry-Government Partnership for
Cyber Defense," Journal of Strategic Security 4: 2 (2011): 97-112.
11 Ibid.
12 Internet Security Alliance, “Improving our Nation’s Cybersecurity through the Public‐
Private Partnership,” White Paper, March 8, 2001.
13 Executive order 13636; Section 7(d)
10
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appointed by Speaker of the House John Boehner.14 By 2015 there had been
such a consensus developed that cyber security would best be addressed
through a voluntary industry-government partnership process that
independent assessors were reporting that it was difficult to find anyone in
the nation’s Capital who disagreed with the wisdom of the voluntary
partnership model.15

How to Make Public-Private Partnerships for Cyber Security
Work: Case Studies
Realizing that frustration with the partnership model was building in 2011,
the IT Sector Coordinating Council (IT SCC) wrote to DHS Under Secretary
for critical infrastructure, Rand Beers, and requested that DHS join with the
IT SCC in a process to develop a set of collaborative guidelines for operating
effective partnerships for cyber security. Working together, the Government
Coordinating Council (IT GCC) for IT and the industry sector coordinating
council (IT SCC) devised a three-step program using an adaption of critical
incident methodology.
First, leaders from the SCC and GCC would select a sample of six programs
that had sought to use the partnership as spelled out in the NIPP. Second,
since it was understood that government and industry could look at the same
program and come to different conclusions as to its effectiveness, the GCC
and SCC were asked to independently analyze the programs by accessing
planning documents and interviewing key participants. The goals of the
interviews were to assess the participant’s judgment as to whether the
programs were successful or unsuccessful in meeting their goals, and to
identify characteristics of the programs that would explain why the programs
were labeled as successful or unsuccessful. Finally, the independent GCC and
SCC leadership teams jointly analyzed all the results from step two and
attempted to identify common elements that were used in successful and
unsuccessful programs. Both government and industry independently agreed
which programs fit into the successful and less successful categories and were
able to identify a dozen “best practices” that were found to have been
commonly used in the successful projects and not in the less successful ones.
The results of the study were presented at the annual 2012 IT/Comms
Government-Industry “Quad” conference in 2012. A summary of this analysis
Office of U.S. Representative Thornberry, “Recommendation of the House Republican
Cyber Security Task Force,” October 2011, available at:
http://thornberry.house.gov/uploadedfiles/cstf_final_recommendations.pdf.
15 Jarno Limnell, "Cybersecurity Is a Team Sport," Politico, May 15, 2015, available at:
http://www.politico.eu/article/cybersecurity-is-a-team-sport/.
14
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and its results follows.16

A Partnership Success Story: The 2006 National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP)
Development of the 2006 NIPP was the result of a collaborative process that
reflected multiple rounds of stakeholder review and comment during which
the Department received thousands of individual comments. The private
sector was given the opportunity to participate in the NIPP 2006 drafting
process and reported that DHS made a genuine effort to include them in its
development. The final 2006 NIPP recognized that partnership is the
appropriate model for coordination between industry and DHS. In addition,
existing cross-sector organizations or their predecessors (like the Partnership
for Critical Infrastructure Security) participated and provided a valuable cross
sector viewpoint to the 2006 NIPP. Both the government and industry
leadership teams agreed that the process used to create the 2006 NIPP was an
example of partnership success.

What Was Successful and Unsuccessful in This Effort
Early involvement by industry in the 2006 NIPP development was judged to
be a key to a successful product. The opportunity for industry to provide
inputs as the document was being developed was judged by both DHS and the
IT SCC as fundamental to the success of the final document. Among the
characteristics praised by both industry and the government were:





Co-drafting: Reflection of private sector comments in the final
language demonstrated that DHS respected and was listening to its
partner.
Personal commitment by DHS: DHS Assistant Secretary for
Infrastructure Protection Robert Stephan owned the NIPP 2006
process and was committed to partnership with all the stakeholders –
including the critical infrastructures—in drafting it. He frequently
showed his engagement and leadership by engaging directly in draft
language related discussions with stakeholder groups in calls or in
person.
Personal commitment by industry: The leaders of industry’s Sector
Coordinating Councils (SCCs) and Information Sharing and analysis
Centers (ISACs) and other bodies were equally engaged.

Information Technology Sector Coordinating Committee, “Best Practices for
Partnership,” Internet Security Alliance, 2012.
16
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A Partnership Success Story: The IT Sector Baseline Risk
Assessment
The IT Sector Baseline Risk Assessment was developed as part of the Sector’s
implementation of the Sector Specific Plan (IT SSP). The Risk Assessment
departed from the traditional physical risk assessments, which focused on
identifying critical assets and instead identified six “Critical Functions” that
the IT Sector provides. The goal of the assessment was to identify high
consequence/high likelihood events to prioritize risk mitigation resources and
efforts.
Over 70 subject matter experts from industry and government participated in
the development of the IT Sector Baseline Risk Assessment. The IT SCC and
IT GCC each appointed a co-chair to the committee that developed the Risk
Assessment, thereby providing joint authority and accountability. The cochairs met regularly to develop and map timelines, plan future meetings,
track ongoing initiatives, and resolve any conflicts. The committee of
industry and government subject matter experts met two to four times a
month to develop the risk assessment methodology. Both industry and
government judged this program a successful partnership.

What was Successful and Unsuccessful in this Effort
Among the characteristics praised by both industry and the government were:




Having industry and government co-chairs ensured joint
accountability and authority, with defined roles and responsibilities for
each co-chair.
Committee decisions were made on a consensus basis, with extensive
efforts to accommodate all reasonable considerations.
Support staff captured action items and impartially drafted meeting
materials based on committee discussions, as opposed to any predetermined or hidden agenda.

A Partnership Success Story: The Cyber Space Policy Review
Shortly after taking office, President Obama assigned staff of the National
Security Council to conduct an intensive review of our nation’s cyber
readiness—both public and private. This process led to the publication of the
Administration’s signature document on cyber security—The Cyber Space
Policy Review (CSPR). The CSPR was a “clean slate review” assessing all US
policies and structures for cyber security. The review team of government
59
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cyber security experts actively engaged and received input from a broad crosssection of industry, academia, the civil liberties and privacy communities,
state governments, international partners and the legislative and Executive
branches. The review team systematically reached out to the specifically
designated elements of the public private partnership as identified in the
NIPP, such as the SCCs and the ISACs. The process was multi-faceted
including both public and private meetings of substantive nature and an
active effort was made to solicit written input from stakeholders. Both
industry and government assessed this program as an example of a successful
partnership.

What was Successful and Unsuccessful in the Effort
Among the characteristics praised by both industry and the government were:









Starting with a “clean slate”. The review team did not betray a bias
toward a particular ideology or approach but rather sought to openly
solicit perspectives of all elements of the partnership and then
integrate them into a coherent volume.
Broad stakeholder involvement. The review team of government cyber
security experts actively engaged and received input from a broad
cross section of stakeholders. The drafters clearly had listened to the
various inputs as is evidenced in the numerous quotations from these
inputs cited in the Review.
Utilizing the NIPP. The review team systematically reached out to the
specifically designated elements of the public private-partnership as
identified in the NIPP.
Input. An active effort was made to solicit written input from
stakeholders.
Early engagement with the private sector.

A Less Successful Partnership Effort: Industry Integration into
the National Infrastructure Coordination Center
Building a joint industry-government cyber operations center had been a
longstanding goal of both industry and government. Although this initiative
was not technically a joint SCC and GCC initiative, it did involve open
operational collaboration and engagement between industry and government.
Specific NSTAC members created a Concept of Operations (Con Ops) for the
joint operations center and it was subjected to a pilot program. Members of
the pilot program agreed to the Con Ops, thereby providing binding partners
60
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to the same program rules and operations. A common portal was used so that
participating organizations could share information and see what others
submitted and “Cross Sector Analysts” were responsible for doing additional
correlation and analysis. Both industry and government assessed this
program as an example of a less successful partnership.
What was Unsuccessful in this Effort
While DHS used elements of the above program to attempt to build an
integrated capability, the program was not developed in collaboration with
industry. As a result, analysts from both the IT SCC and the GCC identified
various shortcomings with this program. For example:






There was no common governing document or framework for the
program.
Participants were not told who else was participating in the program,
so they did not know who else was receiving the information they
shared.
There was no clarity or transparency on the criteria used to determine
who qualified for this program.
Instead of building situational awareness among participating
organizations by providing access to the shared information on a
common portal, only DHS analysts had access to the information
shared by program participants.

A Less Successful Partnership Effort: Information Technology
Supply Chain Risk Management Collaboration
Both industry and government had agreed to develop cohesive policy to
manage cyber security supply chain risk. Unfortunately, the private sector felt
blocked in its efforts to collaborate due to the lack of information sharing
regarding DHS efforts. The private sector felt the lack of information sharing
was undermining the public-private partnership as well as fueling the
proliferation of multiple, uncoordinated efforts to address supply chain risk
management issues within the U.S. Government. Both industry and
government assessed this program as an example of a less successful
partnership.

What was Unsuccessful in this Effort
Overall, the general lack of communication by government to industry was
mutually judged to be unproductive and had the potential to breed
61
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misinformation, which exacerbated the challenge of building an effective
public-private effort. Specifically it was found that:




DHS did not share details or specific supply chain risk management
assessment or evaluation criteria and other practices and policies that
they were considering applying to the private sector.
DHS declined to engage in a substantive discussion regarding current
IT supply chain risk management practices and standards or potential
policies and regulations, when requested by the private sector.

A Less Successful Effort: Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future—
The Cyber Security Strategy for the Homeland Security
Enterprise Program and Fundamentally Altering the PublicPrivate Partnership
Although the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and the Cyber Space
Policy Review both articulated the need for a voluntary public-private
partnership, and government officials publically had testified pledging their
support for this effort, DHS launched a series of policy programs inconsistent
with this direction.
One prominent example was the so-called “Blueprint” and “Enterprise”
programs. The policy papers accompanying these programs argued that the
voluntary partnership was not working and that there was a need to alter the
voluntary public-private partnership and fundamentally change it into a
traditional regulatory model. At no point did DHS or any other federal
agency engage the partnership model to explain why this change in
philosophy had been reached, or what the evidence was that problems related
to cyber security issues were the result of market failures. When the existence
of these efforts came to light, elements of the partnership were asked for only
limited input and advised they would be engaged only at the implementation
stages. Both industry and government assessed this program as an example
of a less successful partnership.

What was Unsuccessful in this Effort
Many in the private sector found it disingenuous for elements at DHS to
advocate for a fundamentally different structure of the partnership model
(switching from voluntary to a government mandate system) without ever
engaging the partnership model to discuss the reasons for this dramatic
change. The lack of trust these efforts engendered was magnified as DHS
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publically espoused the benefits of the partnership model. The papers created
ill will and undermined the ability for the partnership to function in the
national interest. As a result, the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure
Security (PCIS ), which represents all critical industry sectors, formally
protested these non-partnership activities to Secretary Napolitano and noted
that the mistrust these programs engendered truncated partnership programs
as DHS eventually acknowledged. Specific items cited as problematic in the
“Blueprint” effort were:


While it is clearly stated in the NIPP that economics are a central issue
in developing a sustainable cyber security partnership with the private
sector, DHS never produced any economic analysis. As a result the
“blueprint for the cyber eco-system” failed to even consider one of the
most central elements of that econ-system. Analyses from both the
government and industry agreed in retrospect that this critical
omission would not have occurred if a more inclusive process had been
used.

Cyberstorm and National Level Exercise
The Cyber Storm Exercise series and the National Level Exercise series have
been opportunities to leverage the partnership to help manage risks. National
Level Exercises: NLE2012 was the first tier 1 exercise on cyber, and was an
opportunity to leverage the partnership to enhance prevention, detection, and
operational and policy response. Many of the lessons learned through the
Cyber Storm series however were not leveraged for NLE2012. The exercise
series has received mixed reviews with some notable successes and sustained
criticism for the lack of follow through from the exercises.

What was Unsuccessful in this Effort
Analysts reported both successful and unsuccessful elements of the series.
Among the successful items were:
Early Strategic Engagement





Integrating participating communities in a joint coordinated planning
process.
Enabling participating organizations and sectors to identify objectives,
and ultimately harmonize those so that ALL participants gained value,
and exercise play was appropriately synchronized and coordinated via
a core scenario.
Establishing a National Private Sector Working Group to engage the
63
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participation and expertise of a wide range of private sector
stakeholders.
Room for Improvement




While NLE 2012 raised awareness about cyber risks to a broader
community and examined intergovernmental coordination to some
degree, the insights could have been greater for all participants if the
partnership had been more fully leveraged.
The findings and recommendations in NLE 2012 were notably similar
to many recommendations from previous exercises, including the
Cyber Storm Exercise series. Marginal improvements occurred, but
meaningful and substantial progress to coordinate and enhance the
collective cyber security response capability between government and
industry was not made.

Best Practices Generated by the Joint DHS Private Sector Case
Studies
Based on the joint government-industry analysis of the six partnership
projects summarized above, a set of a dozen best practices that consistently
generated successful partnership programs on both a substantive and
operational maintenance level were agreed to. Subsequently the PCIS, which
is the body designated in the NIPP to represent all the critical industry
sectors, endorsed the best practices and has urged DHS to officially embrace
them as well. As of this writing DHS has proposed a Memo of Understanding
to the PCIS that will embrace these principles for operating future
partnership programs. These best practices are:








Senior level commitment to the partnership process communicated to
staff & upper echelons.
Involvement at the priority/goal and objective phases of projects, not
just implementation.
Use of the process identified in the NIPP for involving industry.
Reaching out to stakeholders early on, ideally at the “blank page”
stage.
Continuous and regular interaction between government and industry
stakeholders.
Providing adequate time for stakeholder review (equivalent to
government review).
Establishing co-leadership of programs
64
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Consensus partnership decision making.
Communicating genuine interest in stakeholder input e.g. via codrafting.
Adequate engagement from federal agencies beyond DHS
Government follow through on partnership related decisions
Adequate and competent support services

Following Best Practices in Regulated and Unregulated
Industries: More Success Stories
The NIST Cyber Security Framework
President Obama’s Executive Order 13636 on Cyber security instructed NIST
to launch a collaborative process with industry designed to develop a
“framework” for critical infrastructure cyber security. Rather than impose the
subsequent framework by seeking additional regulatory authority, as it had
done previously through the Lieberman-Collins bill, the Administration
pledged to retain a voluntary approach supplemented by the deployment of a
set of market incentives.
This NIST process embodied virtually every one of the best practices
identified in the IT Sector- DHS partnership study. The President himself
launched the process via an Executive Order and senior officials regularly
reemphasized commitment to the process. NIST made every effort to not
only involve industry but also make the framework an “industry framework
not a government framework.” This included an extensive process of six
national workshops across the country that brought in hundreds of
stakeholders. This process was complemented by an extensive series of
private meetings with interested stakeholders. NIST regularly updated drafts
of the Framework with adequate time for industry review and comment and
embraced comments and made substantial and clearly evident changes as the
process matured. NIST also did not display the sometimes-pernicious
tendency of government agencies to claim “ownership” of the process.
Perhaps, in part due to the clear direction directly from the President, NIST
comfortably folded in adequate engagement from other government agencies.
Although at this writing the final Framework has only been out for just two
years, the feedback has been nearly unanimous in praising the process.
Michael Daniel, White House special assistant to the president and cyber
security coordinator, has called industry’s response to the framework
“phenomenal.” A second White House official, Ari Schwartz, senior director
65
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for cyber security, added that business support for the framework has
“exceeded expectations.” Such recognition is constructive and helps keep the
private sector engaged in using the framework and promoting it with business
partners.17
From the industry side, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce—which had
vehemently opposed the Obama Administration’s earlier efforts on cyber
security—now echoed the Administration’s assessment of the NIST process:
“The Chamber believes that the release of the Framework for
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cyber security has been a
remarkable success. The Chamber, sector-based coordinating councils
and associations, companies, and other private and public entities
collaborated closely with NIST in developing the framework since the
first workshop was held in April 2013. Critical infrastructure sectors
are keenly aware of and supportive of the framework.”18
The financial services industry, one of the sectors most targeted and most
severely affected by cyber- attacks, also expressed strong support for the NIST
process.
“Regarding the Framework development process, it was a success due
in large part to its transparency and because it sought to harmonize
various views into a cohesive whole. We applaud that NIST’s process
for developing the Framework engaged these other sectors during the
Framework’s drafting. NIST’s successful approach at inclusion of so
many essential parties is reflected in how broadly embraced the
Framework has become across so many sectors.”19
However, a process that generates a positive effect is inadequate if the larger
public policy goals are not met. Here again, the NIST process seems to be
generating commitment and advancement to improved cyber security:
“With respect to the Framework, its true value is that it synthesizes a
Steven Chabinsky, "What is the Most Influential Cyber Security Team?" Security
Magazine, September 1, 2013, available at:
http://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/84677-what-is-the-most-influential-cybersecurity-team.
18 U.S. Chamber of Commerice, Comments on the NIST Request for Information on the
Cyber Framework, October 10, 2014, available at:
http://csrc.nist.gov/cyberframework/rfi_comment_october_2014/20141010_uscc_egg
ers_rev1.pdf.
19 Ibid.
17
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process for cyber risk management that is accessible from the
boardroom to the operations floor, across not only individual
enterprises but also entire sectors. It relies on international standards
and is consistent with the regulatory requirements that have been in
place for our sector for more than a decade. It is a ‘Rosetta Stone’ in
that it provides a common lexicon for categorizing and managing cyber
risks across sectors and enterprises for various unifying risk
management jargons and creates a common understanding around
various risk management terms, methodologies, ideas and language.
As a result, we have heard from member financial institutions that in
terms of internal enterprise usage, Chief Information Security Officers
(CISOs) are using the Framework to communicate ideas and achieve
“buy-in” for various cyber security initiatives. Externally, firms are
beginning to use it to communicate expectations and requirements to
vendors.”20

CSRIC Working Group 4 (FCC and Communications Sector)
The U.S. Department of Commerce has no regulatory authority and hence its
sub-division, NIST, might be expected not to utilize a more traditional
regulatory model when seeking to promote improved cyber security behavior
in the private sector. By contrast, many elements of the telecommunications
sector come from a strong and varied regulatory history. Hence, when the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) undertook the task of engaging
the industries under its authority to promote improved cyber security
practices it might have been expected that they would resort to a legacy model
of federal regulations supplemented by adapting historic state and local
authorities. However FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler chose instead to call for a
“new paradigm” to address the unique challenges of digital technology and
asked industry and Commission staff to utilize the Communications Security,
Reliability and Interoperability Council (CSRIC Working Group 4) process to
find a new way to implement the NIST Framework within the
communications industry.
CSRIC Working Group 4 launched a 6-month process to operationalize the
“new paradigm” sought by Chairman Wheeler. The process embraced
virtually all of the previously identified best practices. And much like the
NIST process, the reviews from both government and industry have been
starkly positive.
In a featured speech at the 2015 RSA Security Conference, FCC Chairman
Wheeler said Working Group 4:

20
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"…developed a range of activities intended to provide transparent
assurances to the FCC, to DHS, to industry, and to consumers. These
visible assurances should provide confidence that companies
throughout the sector are actually taking effective steps to manage
cyber risk… I believe that CSRIC's assurance model will provide muchneeded accountability foCSr network security, while avoiding topdown prescriptive regulation of industry practices. A cooperative and
collaborative approach is the FCC's preferred means of engagement. I
have every reason to be confident the industry will live up to its
commitments and deliver meaningful action.”21

Conclusion
Cyber security is one of the areas of public policy where substantial consensus
has emerged. There is broad agreement that the security problem is severe
and growing and that the traditional regulatory model does not fit well with
unique characteristics of the Internet and the conscious and sustained attacks
on it. Instead, a novel, voluntary, and economically sustainable partnership
between industry and government needs to evolve. Early efforts at
partnership met with inconsistent success.
More recently, however, industry and government have collaborated and
identified a set of practical guidelines or “best practices” for managing cyber
partnership activities. This more sophisticated notion of partnership departs
from having critical functions decided unilaterally by government, with
industry’s role confined to comment, implementation, or compliance.
Instead, the new partnership model requires, among other things, that the
partners share leadership, appreciate each other’s differing perspectives, and
develop partnership priorities, goals, and objectives together.
Notwithstanding the mounting evidence that these partnerships, properly
managed, are generating success in an extremely challenging arena,
government agencies may be reluctant to depart from the traditional
regulatory model for a model that requires more time and collaboration on
the front end, and less traditional enforcement on the back end. However, the
digital economy of the 21st century may demand an evolution away from the
legacy independent regulatory model developed in the 19th century. When
utilized, this approach has, at least initially, driven meaningful cyber security
accomplishments.
Tom Wheeler, FCC Chairman, Prepared Remarks for RSA Conference, April 21, 2015 in
San Francisco, CA.
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